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What is a “Real” Argument?
G.C. GODDU
Department of Philosophy
University of Richmond
Richmond, VA 23173
U.S.A.
ggoddu@richmond.edu
Abstract: Numerous informal logicians and argumentation theorists
restrict their theorizing to what they
call “real” arguments. But is there a
clear distinction to be made between
“real” and “non-real” arguments?
Here I explore four possible accounts
of the alleged distinction and argue
that none can serve the theoretical
uses to which the distinction is most
often put.

Résumé: Plusieurs logiciens non
formels et théoriciens de l’argumentation limitent leur construction de
théories à ce qu’ils appellent des
arguments « authentiques ». Mais y-at’il une distinction claire entre des
arguments« authentiques » et « inauthentiques » ? Ici j’explore quatre
descriptions possibles de cette prétendue distinction et je soutiens qu’aucune ne répond aux besoins théoriques auxquels elles sont censées répondre.

Keywords: argument, actual, contrived, counterexample, everyday, genuine,
hypothetical, informal logic, natural, specialized.

1. Introduction
Informal logic has a predilection for focusing on “real” arguments.
For example, Leo Groarke writes, “In keeping with the emphasis
on real argument, I will discuss musical argument in the context of
examples of actual argument” (Groarke 2003a, p. 419). David
Hitchcock writes, “Theorizing about arguments often suffers from
a lack of attention to actual arguments” (Hitchcock 1998, p. 15). In
some cases, the very nature of informal logic is tied up with this
focus. For example, in early writings on the subject, Ralph Johnson
and Anthony Blair characterize informal logic in part as “a focus
on the actual natural language arguments used in public discourse,
clothed in their native ambiguity, vagueness and incompleteness”
(Blair and Johnson 1980, p. x). Trudy Govier writes: “What is
strange is that in view of these substantial gaps between real
© G.C. Goddu. Informal Logic, Vol. 29, No.1, pp. 1-14.
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arguments and the subject matter of formal logic, formal logic is
still widely regarded as having something to offer to the nonspecialist” (Govier 1987, p. 2) and “To speak of informal logic is
not to contradict oneself but to acknowledge what should be
obvious: that the understanding of natural arguments requires
substantive knowledge and insight not captured in the rules of
axiomatized systems” (Govier 1987, p. 204). In other words, real or
natural arguments are not the subject matter of formal logic, but
rather what Govier calls “practical logic”. Ralph Johnson, for
example, takes these passages from Govier as grounds for
attributing to her the view that “informal logic is the logic of real
arguments” (Johnson 1999, p. 268 [see also 2000, p. 121]). Finally,
Johnson puts one of the vices of “formal logic” as “the virtual
disappearance from the mandate of logic of the focus on real
arguments” (Johnson 2000, p. 105).
I am not an informal logician—though admittedly, I am not
sure what it would take to be one. I am, however, very interested in
understanding the nature of arguments and in producing a general
theory of arguments. So my question here is—does the notion of
“real” argument have any place in a general theory of argument?
Put another way, is the concept of a “real” argument a theoretically
significant one? To answer this question it is necessary to try to
understand what “real” arguments are.
In section 2, I examine four possibilities for what a “real”
argument is—a genuine argument, an actual argument, an everyday
argument, or a natural argument. I argue that each possibility faces
difficulties. In section 3, I discuss the theoretical uses to which the
notion of “real” argument is put and argue that none of the four
candidates can serve these purposes. I conclude that the concept of
a “real” argument is not a theoretically significant concept.
2. Four options for “real” argument
So what is a “real” argument? According to Johnson, “How to
characterize this realm is a difficult matter. As we saw, Govier
(1987) used various phrases to refer to it: ‘naturally occurring
arguments,’ ‘natural argumentation,’ ‘real arguments.’ Others have
used phrases such as ‘mundane argument’ or ‘everyday argument’”
(Johnson 2000, p. 92). Yet more phrases I would add to this list
include ‘actual arguments’ (Govier 1987, p. 4; Blair and Johnson
1980, p. 4), ‘marketplace arguments’ (Gilbert 2002, p. 22), ‘reallife arguments’, and ‘ordinary arguments’. Given all these
possibilities and given differences amongst theorists in the use of
these phrases, I shall, for the sake of clarity and brevity, focus on
four possible distinctions that one might be trying to demarcate by
appeal to “real” arguments, viz., genuine versus non-genuine,
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actual versus hypothetical, everyday versus specialized, and natural
versus contrived.
Option 1: Real arguments are genuine arguments as opposed to
non-genuine arguments.
Just as genuine diamonds are diamonds and non-genuine diamonds
are not, genuine arguments are arguments and non-genuine
arguments are not arguments at all. The distinction between
genuine and non-genuine arguments is clearly theoretically
significant. The distinction shows up in numerous debates in
argumentation theory. For example, debate has raged over whether
texts without a dialectical tier component are not genuine
arguments (Groarke 2002; Hitchcock 2002; Johnson 2002; Tindale
2002). Also, the debates about whether works of art or music can
be arguments (Groarke 2003b; Johnson 2003) or whether the
performance of a judo flip can be an argument (Gilbert 2003) are
attempts to distinguish genuine from non-genuine arguments.
Argumentation theorists may not stop at just genuine versus
non-genuine, for it may turn out that some of the non-genuine
arguments are similar enough to bona fide arguments that care must
be taken to distinguish the genuine ones from the pseudo ones. We
might even call particular uses of the pseudo arguments, i.e., ones
used deliberately to deceive someone into thinking an argument has
been presented when in fact it has not, fake arguments. Appeal to
pseudo arguments and fake arguments would be theoretically
relevant to argumentation theory as part of demarking genuine
arguments from non-genuine arguments.
Given the genuine/non-genuine distinction, the focus on “real”
arguments is just an insistence that a correct argument theory
should be a theory of arguments and not include non-arguments in
the mix. In other words, previous theorists are wrong about what
arguments are and we need, instead, to focus on “real”, i.e.,
genuine arguments.
Though clearly theoretically useful, the distinction between
genuine and non-genuine or between genuine and pseudo
arguments is not, I strongly suspect, the distinction informal
logicians are trying capture by the notion of “real” arguments. For
example, Govier gives the following example from Copi: “Any
author is successful if and only if he is well read. All authors are
intellectuals. Some authors are successful but not well read.
Therefore all intellectuals are authors” (Govier 1987, p. 4) as the
sort of thing that is not a real argument. Granted, it may be stilted
and not a normal sort of expression we expect to come across in
our everyday lives, but one would be hard pressed to argue that the
sentences do not express at least the core of an argument. After all,
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the sentence ‘For all numbers n, if n is even and n is prime, then n
is both divisible by and equal to 2’ may be stilted and not the
normal sort of expression we expect to come across, even in
standard mathematical situations, but it is still a sentence.
Clearly the genuine versus non-genuine argument distinction is
theoretically significant. Equally clearly, the distinction is a
significant source of disagreement and debate such that if the
real/unreal distinction is the genuine/non-genuine distinction, then
resolving the matter will be far beyond what can be accomplished
in a single short paper. Hence, for the remainder of this paper I
shall assume that the issue is whether, within the class of genuine
arguments, there is a theoretically significant distinction to be made
between the “real” genuine arguments and the “non-real” genuine
arguments.
Option 2: Real arguments are everyday arguments as opposed to
specialized arguments.
For example, Johnson and Blair write: “By informal logic we mean
to designate a branch of logic which is concerned to develop nonformal standards … for the analysis … of argumentation in
everyday discourse” (Johnson and Blair 1987, p. 147). That there is
a rough and ready distinction to be made between everyday and
specialized arguments cannot be denied—one can easily begin by
suggesting that the former occur quite often in debates about which
movie to go see, letters to the editor, or on talk shows, etc., whereas
the latter are to be found in the books and journals of the various
specialized academic disciplines. That the rough distinction is
theoretically useful, however, is far from obvious.
Firstly, argumentation theorists/informal logicians hardly
restrict themselves to the “everyday” side of the rough
everyday/specialized divide. For example, Johnson, in Manifest
Rationality, points out that “real arguments, such as is the focal
point of the theory developed in this book, complete with their core
and dialectical trappings, will appear too erudite, too talky, or too
rational to make an appearance on Oprah” (Johnson 2000, p. 18).
Also, in The logic of real arguments, Alec Fisher asserts that the
“focus of interest is not so much on everyday reasoning as on
theoretical argument” (Fisher 1988, p. vii).
Secondly, the rough and ready “distinction” between everyday
and specialized arguments is more likely to be a continuum of
cases rather than a neat partitioning. But if arguments are more
everyday or less everyday, more specialized or less specialized,
then, unless we want to talk of more real and less real arguments,
we cannot use the everyday/specialized continuum to demarcate the
class of “real” arguments. Certainly, a similar point has been made
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about another version of the everyday/specialized distinction—
what is often called the practical/theoretical distinction.
According to Robert Craig, Jonsen and Toulmin (1988)
distinguish Theory from Practice on the grounds that they
characteristically involve different kinds of argumentation. Theory
employs formal arguments in which particular conclusions are
deduced logically from universal principles. Practice, in contrast,
employs informal or practical arguments which “involve a wider
range of factors than formal deductions and are read with an eye to
their occasion of use” (Craig1996, p. 461). Perhaps then real
arguments are the arguments of practice. Consider that Govier’s
preferred term in her Problems in Argument Analysis and
Evaluation is “practical logic”. But as Craig points out, Jonsen and
Toulmin acknowledge that Theory and Practice are ideal types that
mark the extreme ends of a continuum (Clark 1996, p. 462). Clark
goes on to argue that, “Theory is essentially involved in the highly
informal argumentative discourses of everyday life, no less than
Practice is essentially involved in the most rigorously, formal,
scientific disciplines” (Clark 1996, p. 463).
Option 3: Real arguments are actual arguments as opposed to
hypothetical arguments.
According to C.L. Hamblin, “ ‘If P, then Q’ is not a real argument
at all, but only a hypothetical argument. It says that a certain
hypothetical statement P, which I am not now making, would
serve, if I were to invoke it, as a premises for a possible conclusion
Q; but the argument remains hypothetical because I do not, or not
necessarily, now argue this way. A real argument has real premises
and conclusion, not hypothetical ones” (Hamblin 1970, p. 233).
Ralph Johnson writes of Hamblin’s work that “he stressed the
importance of dealing with real arguments as opposed to imagined
or hypothetical or artificially constructed ones” (Johnson 2000, p.
101).
If the distinction between actual and hypothetical arguments is
to serve as the grounds for demarcating the class of “real”
arguments, then we need to know what the difference between
actual and hypothetical arguments is. Unfortunately, there are
several possibilities and little agreement. Firstly, one might hold
that actual arguments are arguments with premises that have been
actually asserted rather than merely supposed “for the sake of
argument”. But several informal logicians object to this restriction
as itself unwarranted. For example, Fisher writes:
Arguments employing suppositions are common enough
in theoretical contexts—in mathematics, in the physical
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sciences, the biological sciences, social studies and
philosophy—… so we must explain carefully how to
handle suppositions in argument analysis if we are not to
leave a serious gap (Fisher 1988, p. 83; see also Walton
1996, pp. 11-15).

In addition, this restriction would seemingly remove any reductio
ad absurdum or arguments for the induction clause in a
mathematical induction from the realm of interest—yet such
arguments have clearly been of interest to informal logicians.
Secondly, one might hold that actual arguments are arguments
that have actually been made as opposed to ones that merely could
be made (see Fohr 1980, p. 6). On this account the reductios that
have been made are actual arguments and so in the realm of
interest. Unfortunately, this attempt at actual arguments excludes
all those arguments that have been used merely as examples to
establish a particular point. For example, Govier uses the following
as a counterexample to the claim that all arguments are
explanations: “(1) Jones is a Liberal. (2) Jones is fat. (3) Jones is a
bachelor. Therefore, (4) Jones is a fat, Liberal bachelor. Therefore,
(5) There are fat Liberal bachelors” (Govier 1987, p. 164) and
Walton uses the following as a counterexample to Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst’s proposal for distinguishing linked from
convergent arguments: “Bob likes red a lot. Linda thought she saw
Bob, and it looked like he was wearing a red tie. Therefore, Bob is
wearing a red tie” (Walton 1996, p. 136). Neither Govier nor
Walton actually argue for the conclusions of these arguments—the
arguments are merely used as counterexamples. But if the
definition of actual arguments is expanded to include these uses of
examples to illustrate the truth or falsity of certain theoretical
claims about arguments, then surely the definition will let in those
very arguments that Govier and Johnson and Blair were seeking to
exclude, viz., “series of statements constructed by logicians to
illustrate their principles and techniques” (Govier 1987, p. 4) and
“those which are invented just in order to serve as examples” (Blair
and Johnson 1980, p. 27 n. 20).
Even without a clear notion of what a hypothetical argument
is, from the perspective of producing an adequate theory of
argument, we should be very wary of excluding non-actual
arguments, for we will sometimes appeal to non-actual arguments
in our explanations. For example, one might consider a whole set
of possible arguments for a position one wants to advocate, but
advance and defend only two or three of them. Assuming that no
one has ever advanced the remaining arguments in the set, they are
not actual, at least in the sense that they have never been (and, we
might suppose, never will be) offered to change an audience’s
attitudes concerning the position. But we might ask why the left-
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overs were rejected and presumably the answer might be that they
are clearly bad arguments and would have failed if offered.
Consider also that our theory of natural phenomena needs to
cover not only the actual instances, but the purely possible
instances as well. Even if all salt were suddenly to vanish from the
universe (which would be quite disastrous for us), our physical
theory still needs to be able to say what would happen if a
hypothetical batch of salt were to be placed in a cup of water.
Similarly we want an adequate theory of arguments to be able to
say what would (or would likely) happen if hypothetical argument
X were advanced in hypothetical situation S to hypothetical
audience A.
Option 4: Real arguments are natural arguments as opposed to
contrived arguments.
For example, according to Fisher the objects of concern are “real
arguments—not the ‘made-up’ kind with which logicians usually
deal. They originate from various sources ranging from classic
texts to newspapers” (Fisher 1988, p. 15). According to Govier,
an actual argument is simply an argument, a piece of
discourse or writing in which someone tries to convince
others (or himself) of the truth of a claim by citing reasons
on its behalf. I speak of actual arguments because I do not
wish to speak of the contrived arguments—series of
statements constructed by logicians to illustrate their
principles and techniques (Govier 1987, p. 4).
In one sense all arguments are contrived—the real question is
for what purpose are they contrived. Some are contrived as
attempts to convince some audience of something. Some are
contrived as exemplifications of particular general forms or
patterns of reasoning—either valid or fallacious. Some are
contrived as counterexamples to particular parts of various theories
of arguments. Some are contrived as exercises for logic
textbooks—symbolic, informal, etc.
Presumably it is the first use that is meant as the primary use of
natural arguments—arguments constructed to convince, persuade,
or change the acceptance level of, some audience of something. But
consider that arguments that may at one time have been contrived
for the purpose of convincing an audience may now be used solely
as examples or counterexamples; whereas arguments that may have
been originally contrived as examples may actually be used to
argue for a given position. If the class of natural arguments is
composed of those arguments contrived for the purpose of
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convincing, then the former would be natural arguments despite
their ‘quaint’ appearance now and the latter contrived arguments
despite their current usage. If natural arguments are defined as
those arguments that have ever been used to convince, then the
natural/contrived distinction just becomes a variant of the
actual/hypothetical distinction already discussed.
Perhaps the difficulty can be avoided by defining the natural
arguments as those that could reasonably be used to convince an
audience of something. The problem now is to specify what counts
as “reasonably used” in such a way that the sorts of arguments that
Govier, and Johnson and Blair, and others rail against will in fact
be excluded. This problem is especially acute if one can find
examples of especially bad or especially artificial sounding cases
that have been actually used to argue a point, for then a strong case
can be made that lots of other arguments like them could also be so
used. Indeed, the case of especially bad arguments poses a special
problem since any adequate theory of arguments will, regardless of
whether the bad argument could ever be plausibly used to argue
with or not, need to be able to account for the badness of the
argument. After all, the “obvious” badness of the argument will
explain the lack of plausible use rather than the other way around.
Next I turn to an examination of the possible theoretical uses
of the “real” arguments demarcation, but first two points. Firstly,
combinations of these options exist in the literature. For example,
Blair and Johnson (1980), who lead the charge to focus on “real”
arguments, describe natural arguments as “arguments that have
actually been used to try to persuade people, the sorts of arguments
the student will encounter outside the classroom” (Blair and
Johnson 1980, p. 13) and part of “actual, everyday persuasive
discourse” (Blair and Johnson 1980, p. 14). In addition, they write:
We need a term to refer … to arguments actually used in a
first-order way to attempt to convince—and moreover
used without self-consciousness about the ‘nature’ or
‘structure’ of some ideal argument. The term ‘natural
arguments’ will then distinguish such arguments from
those which are invented just in order to serve as
examples, and also (for the most part) from those which
are self-consciously framed according to an explicit model
of argument (such as arguments with numbered premises
sometimes found in philosophy journal articles) (Blair and
Johnson 1980, p. 27 n. 20).
Here we can see elements of all three of the previous distinctions:
actually used to convince, not invented just to serve as examples,
found in everyday sources outside the classroom. On this account
real arguments just are arguments that are neither contrived nor
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theoretical nor hypothetical. Put another way, real arguments would
then just be actual, everyday natural arguments. Unfortunately, this
proposal, along with any other combinatorial proposal, will just
inherit the defects of each individual option.
Secondly, perhaps there is some distinction other than the four
(and their variants) that I have considered here, that is what
informal logicians are trying to capture under the concept “real”
arguments. If so, I have not found an expression of it in the
literature. Additionally, I see no plausible candidate over and above
the four already considered. Hence, short of a plausible new
alternative being offered, I take these four possibilities as
exhausting the options for what is intended by “real” versus “nonreal” argument. Since each has been found wanting, the prospects
for a theoretically useful class of “real” arguments appear dim.
Regardless, I turn now to considering whether any of these four
distinctions could ground the appeal to a class of “real” arguments.
3. Theoretical uses of “real” arguments?
There seem to be three primary uses of the appeal to “real”
arguments: (i) to demarcate the subject matter of informal logic
(often as opposed to the subject matter of formal logic); (ii) to
defend one’s own theory against counterexamples; and (iii) to show
the inadequacy of either formal logic or formal deductive logic as
theories of argument.
None of the distinctions discussed in the previous section will
support use (i). Anyone interested in arguments is interested in
genuine arguments, whether he or she is an informal logician or
not. Informal logicians certainly do not have a monopoly on
genuine arguments and do not agree amongst themselves what
counts as a genuine argument. Hence, genuine arguments cannot
demarcate the subject matter of informal logic. As we have already
seen, different theorists focus on different parts of the
everyday/theoretical continuum, so everyday arguments cannot
demarcate the subject matter of informal logic. The
actual/hypothetical distinction suffers from both defects—there is
no agreement amongst theorists on where to draw the line and
theorists take as their area of study both actual and hypothetical
arguments. Finally, the distinction between natural and contrived
arguments ultimately seems to depend on the use to which an
argument is put—natural arguments are the ones for which the
conclusion is actually or could be actually argued. But as many
theorists have suggested, arguments have many legitimate uses, one
of which may be convincing/persuading/changing the attitude of an
audience of/toward the conclusion. But the debate over the various
uses of arguments cannot even be a debate within informal logic if
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the subject matter of informal logic is demarcated by appeal to
arguments used in one particular way. In addition, as we saw in the
case of actual and natural arguments above, many informal
logicians use so-called “contrived” cases for valid theoretical
purposes and so if we restrict informal logic to natural arguments,
then these theoretical purposes will not be served.
Indeed, one of the uses the appeal to real arguments is
sometimes put is to defend one’s own theory against
counterexamples. For example, Robert Yanal, in defense of his
theory of how to distinguish linked from convergent arguments,
claims that purported counterexamples such as “It is raining. The
wind is blowing. So, either Rembrandt painted The Polish Rider or
Rembrandt did not paint The Polish Rider” (Yanal 1991, p. 142)
are not necessarily arguments on the grounds that they are not
arguments in the “informal logic or ordinary language sense of
argument”, i.e., they are not “the giving of evidence for something
of the presenting of reasons to believe something” (Yanal 1991, p.
143).
Yanal’s rejection of proposed counterexamples is legitimate if
the distinction he is appealing to is the genuine/non-genuine
distinction. Putting forward a non-genuine argument as a
counterexample to a theoretical principle meant to cover arguments
is obviously a non-starter. The success of such a defense, however,
depends upon having a generally agreed upon account of genuine
arguments, which we do not have. But given that Yanal is
appealing to the informal logic sense of argument, perhaps Yanal
means to claim that while the counterexample is a genuine
argument it is not a “real” argument and the linked/convergent
distinction is only meant to apply to “real” arguments. The success
of this strategy also depends on a clear and theoretically sound
distinction between “real” and “non-real” arguments, which we
again do not have.1
In addition, as we have seen, restricting ourselves to cases of
the giving of evidence or the presenting of reasons removes our
ability to explain why someone who actually argued with argument
A passed up arguments B, C, and D. More generally, given no clear
demarcation of “real” arguments, defending one’s theory by
claiming it is just a theory of “real” arguments runs dangerously
1

In fact, in this particular case, since Yanal’s linked/convergent
distinction is ultimately based on relationships amongst the various
conditional probabilities of the conclusion given the premises
individually and as groups, it is hard to see how these relationships can
legitimately be expected to be well-behaved only in, and so restricted to,
cases in which the premises constitute the giving of evidence or the
presenting of reasons to believe something. (Elsewhere, (Goddu, 2003), I
have shown that the relationships are not even well-behaved for Yanal’s
canonical cases.)
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close to committing the very sin that I suspect motivated, at least in
part, the distinction in the first place—namely, tailoring the
arguments to the theory rather than the theory to the arguments.
After all, one could always reject a proposed counterexample by
saying one’s theory was not designed to accommodate that type of
argument, with the net result being that the type of arguments that
the theorist accepts as legitimate are just those that accord with the
theory.
Finally, what of appealing to the distinction to argue that
formal logic is inadequate as a significant part of a theory of
argument, presumably on the grounds that formal logic cannot
adequately deal with “real” arguments? One would be hard pressed
to argue that there are no everyday, non-contrived, actual
arguments such that “formal” logic (whatever that is) has no
significant role in analyzing or evaluating them. For example,
consider the following brief exchange:
Arthur: “Either we keep the money or we have to figure
out how to return it.”
Sam: “Keeping it is not an option.”
Arthur: “So, we have to figure out how to return it.”
At the very least, the acceptability of Arthur’s reasoning is
demonstrable via so-called “formal” methods. But if the claim is
not that there are no everyday, non-contrived, actual arguments that
formal logic has something useful to say about, but merely that
there are at least some such arguments, then no special class of
“real” arguments is required to show the inadequacy of formal
logic. More specifically, if only some “real” arguments constitute
counterexamples to the adequacy of formal logic, then it is the
features shared by the subset of counterexamples that are relevant
and not the features that allegedly demarcate arguments as “real”.
Perhaps the theoretical significance of “real” arguments can be
defended by making the stronger claim that formal logic could not
play a significant role in any adequate theory of argument because
it cannot accommodate any “real” argument. While there certainly
are hints of this strong thesis in the literature, I am highly skeptical
that this thesis can be vindicated without either trivializing what is
meant by ‘real argument’ or ‘formal logic’ or placing the bar on
what counts as a significant role unacceptably high. For example,
one could define ‘real argument’ to mean just those arguments that
formal logic cannot accommodate or define ‘formal logic’ in such a
way that (i) nothing counts as a formal logic or (ii) the only things
that count as formal logics are things that no one has ever
suggested would or could play the needed role. But what remains to
be seen, and what is clearly beyond the scope of what can be
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accomplished here, is whether any significant sense can be given to
‘real argument’ and ‘formal logic’ that vindicates the strong claim.
4. Conclusion
Given the seemingly close association between informal logic and
“real” arguments, one might take my repudiation of the notion of
“real” arguments as a repudiation of informal logic itself. No such
repudiation is intended or accomplished. If, as I have argued, there
is no clear and theoretically useful class of “real” arguments, then
we should not attempt to define informal logic in terms of such
class. How we should understand informal logic is not my concern
here, though there are plenty of alternative candidates. For
example, in recent work David Hitchcock suggests understanding
informal logic in terms of the sorts of questions it takes as primary
rather than in terms of some class of arguments (Hitchcock, 2007).
Nor should this paper be taken as impugning the motivations
for attempts to demarcate a class of real arguments. Hitchcock’s
worry, quoted at the beginning of this paper, that “theorizing about
arguments often suffers from a lack of attention to actual
arguments” is a legitimate worry even if there is no theoretically
significant class of “real” arguments. A theory that primarily
appeals to trivial or overly contrived or imagined2 cases as
exemplars of the theory (or even worse, tailors itself to fit such
cases) runs the serious risk of being a trivial and inconsequential
theory. Any adequate theory must be able to account for all
legitimate cases, whether trivial or consequential or actual or
hypothetical or everyday or specialized, etc.
Finally, what I have said here does not preclude the notion of a
“real” argument having some use within informal logic. Perhaps
appeal to “real” arguments has a legitimate pedagogical use. For
example, appeal to the rough and ready distinctions between
natural and contrived or everyday and specialized might ground the
pedagogical goal of making the relevance and practical utility of
the subject material obvious to students. Whether the notion of a
“real” argument has any role to play within informal logic has not
been my concern here. I have merely been arguing that the notion
has no useful theoretical role to play in a general theory of
argument.
Unless a clearer notion of “real” argument than the ones
surveyed here is forthcoming, a general theory of argument has no
2

Michael Scriven and Tony Blair, in different conversations, cited the
over-reliance on trivial (Scriven) or imagined (Blair) cases in formal
logic (or at least formal logic as it was being presented in the standard
textbooks) as a primary motivation for the shift to informal logic.
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good reason to demarcate a class of “real” arguments that is a
subset of the class of genuine arguments. On the one hand,
assuming there are counterexamples to the adequacy of formal
logic as part of an adequate theory of argument, no appeal to a class
of “real” arguments seems required to identify these
counterexamples. On the other hand, none of the primary
candidates for “real” arguments, viz., everyday arguments or actual
arguments or natural arguments, can support either a clearly
demarcated subject matter for informal logic or an adequate
defense against counterexamples to one’s preferred theory. Thus,
instead of focusing on an alleged class of “real” arguments, I would
recommend focusing on the theoretically significant and
challenging problem of distinguishing those entities that are
genuine arguments from those that are not.3
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